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Abstract 
On- and off-farm employment offamily farm members has been a permanent phenomenum in U.S. 
agriculture. In this paper, a family-farm model is extended to include both on- and off-farm labor 
supply decisions for farm-households in the U.S. com sector. A unique empirical measure of 
economic welfare is developed to analyze the effects of government price support programs. 
Traditional welfare analysis of farm programs ignores on- and off-farm employment decisions by 
focusing only on 'producer surplus' at the aggregate sector level. We determine that the appropriate 
measure of welfare for the farm-household includes the 'laborer's surplus'. Theoretical results are 
derived to show that conventional analysis overstates the benefits of farm price supports because of 
the tradeoff between producer and laborer's surpluses. Empirical simulations indicate that the 
laborer's surplus is a significant share oftotal farm-household welfare, especially for smaller farm sizes 
that comprise the majority of com farmers in the United States. Results also show that the 
government programs may have been misdirected if the goal has been to improve the farm income 
situation because the few large farms gain much more in aggregate than smaller farms. 
-

A Unique Measure of the Welfare Effects of Price Support Programs for Corn on Family­
Farm Households by Size Distribution 
Introduction 
On- and off-farm employment of family members has been a permanent and important economic 
phenomenum in American agriculture (Gardner, 1992; Ahearn and Lee, 1991). Off-farm participation 
by households increased from 30 percent in 1929 to 53 percent in 1982 (Ahearn and Lee, 1991). The 
proportion of households working 200 or more days per year increased relatively faster than other 
categories, from 6.3 percent in 1929 to 34.6 percent in 1982. 
Table 1 shows that off-farm income is a significant proportion of total household income. In 
1986, an average U.S. farm household earned about $20,212 or 46 percent of total household income 
from off-farm sources. Off-farm income was relatively more significant for smaller farm sizes. 
Households with annual sales of less than $40,000 generated $22,534 or 96 percent of their total 
income from non-farm sources. Large sized households with annual sales of $250,000 and above 
generated $17,562 or five percent oftheir income from non-farm sources. The middle income groups 
with annual sales of$40,00-$99,99 ($100,000-$249,999) generated $13,780 ($12,602) or 13 percent 
(10 percent) oftheir total income from non farm sources. Data for 1989 portrayed a similar picture 
(Gardner, 1992). 
Table 2 indicates that household labor represents a significant input in com production. The 
data shows that owned (unpaid) labor is utilized on the farm more than hired labor. Small sized! off-
farm participants (non-participants) spent $1.10 ($2.54) per hectare on hired labor, compared with 
$41.09 ($49.35) per hectare on unpaid labor. Medium sized! off-farm participants (non-participants) 
-spent $3.92 ($3.17) per hectare on hired labor, compared with $26.13 ($29.34) per hectare on unpaid 
r-' 
labor. Large sized households spent more or less equal amounts on hired and owned labor. 
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Traditional analysis on the social costs of fann price support programs focus only the 
'producer surplus' offann-finns at the sectoral level (Nerlove 1958, Wallace 1962, Gardner 1983, 
Floyd 1974, Gisser 1993). However, much research has recognized the importance of off-fann 
income (Huffinan 1977, Ahearn and Lee 1991, Gardner 1992, Nilsen 1977,) and the need to study 
household off-farm labor supply behavior (Sumner 1982, Huffinan and Lange 1989, Lass, Findeis and 
Hallberg 1991). Multiple job holding is an integral component of fann-household optimization. The 
inclusion ofon- and off-farm labor supply decisions by family fann members requires the use of fann­
household models in analyzing the welfare economic effects ofgovernmental price support programs. 
The purpose ofthis paper is to overcome two major limitations of the literature so far on the 
welfare economics offann price supports. First, we extend the fann-household model to develop a 
unique welfare measure denoted as laborer's surplus (Nakajima, 1986) to include the effects of on­
and off-farm labor supply decisions by family farm members. Own family labor is very significant for 
the majority ofhouseholds both as an input in the farm production process and as an off-fann income 
generator. The concept of laborer's surplus is integrated with the conventional producer surplus 
analysis of the fann-finn. The implications of the analytical framework developed in this paper are 
highlighted by an empirical application to the price support program for com in the United States. 
Second, we use this unique framework to evaluate the distributional economic welfare consequences 
ofgovernment policy across fann size. 
The results show that the conventional analysis overstates the benefits of price supports 
because of the tradeoff between the conventional producer surplus and the concept of laborer's 
surplus integrated into the fann-household model in this paper. Empirical simulations indicate that ­
laborer surplus is a significant share oftotal farm-household welfare, especially for medium and small 
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farm sizes that comprise the majority ofcom fanns. Sectoral analysis of the current literature masks 
the true consequences and distributional benefits from fann programs, especially if the primary 
purpose of price support is to solve the 'fann problem' of low fann incomes and rates of return in 
agriculture (Gardner, 1992). 
The Analytical Model 
We employ the basic agricultural household model where a family faces a labor market to 
hire-in or hire-out labor at a market wage rate (Singh, Squire and Strauss, 1986, Nakajima, 1965; 
1986). Variants of the same model have been developed and employed as a basis to empirically 
estimate off-fann labor supply functions for particular U.S. fann households (Huffinan and Lange, 
1989; Sumner, 1982; Lass, Findeis, and Hallberg, 1991). The agricultural household model is a 
relevant tool of analysis for the economics of fann households since it combines household 
production, consumption and labor supply decisions into a single conceptual framework (Huffman, 
1991). 
Consider a fann household producing a single commodity Q for a given unit price P. 
Suppose the fann household faces a competitive labor market in which to hire-in or hire-out labor 
at an exogenously given wage rate ofW. The household maximizes utility ofmoney income I and 
leisure L, defined as U(I,L). Utility is maximized subject to the fann production constraint Q(r;K), 
the time constraint T=L+U and the money income constraint I=V+[pQ-Wr]+wu, where T 
represents total time endowment, U denotes total quantity of owned labor devoted to all work 
(fanning and off-fann), V is property (exogenous) income, r denotes total fann labor input (both 
-

owned and hired), and K denotes a fixed fann production input (say land). 
The objective function and the first order conditions for utility maximization may be 
3 
summarized as l 
max [U(I,L) - A(I -V -PQ(r;K) -W(T -L-I))] 
1',1.,1,). 
PQp(I" ;K) =W (I a) 
I' = V+[PQ(r';K)-Wr']+W(T-L .) (Ib) 
U (I' L .) 
L ' =W (I c)
UI(I' ,L .) 
where Qp(r';K) is the marginal product oflabor, UL(I ',L .) denotes the marginal utility of time and 
UI(I •,L .) =A is the marginal utility of money income. Since this model consists of a two-staged 
recursive process, the household first maximizes farm profits as indicated by condition 1a. This is the 
case since L, I and A are not among the arguments of equation 1a. This behavior resembles that of 
the farm-firm whereby the sole motive is profit maximization. Equation la is consistent with the 
farm-fum's optimization where labor is utilized up to a point where the value of marginal product of 
labor is just equated to the market wage rate. In the second stage of the recursive structure, the 
household maximizes utility where conditions lb and Ic are simultaneously solved for L' and f, 
subject to the solution from condition 1a. 2 
1 Note that the farm production constraint and the time constraint were substituted into the 
­income constraint to yield a single constraint problem. 
2 From the first order conditions, equation 1a is solved independently of equations 1band 1c, 
meaning that the production side of the model is separable from the consumption side. Optimal 
4
 
Figure 1 is the graphical counterpart of the model where the farm-household hires-in labor 
and Figure 2 depicts the household hiring-out labor. In panel (a) of Figure 1, the curve UU' 
represents the utility function, VvT is the total value product curve and AA' is the money income 
constraint. In panel (b), the curve GvMP is the value of marginal product curve and CC' is the 
marginal valuation offamily labor curve.3 Farm profits are maximized at point Q in panel (a) and at 
point q in panel (b), where the value ofmarginal product is just equated to the wage rate. Therefore, 
the producer's surplus is measured by the distance DQ in panel (a) and by area PS in panel (b). Utility 
is maximized at point L' in panel (a) and point E in panel (b) where conditions Ib and Ic hold (the 
marginal valuation offarnily labor CC' equals the market wage rate W). Total wages are W'ELT and 
total owned labor cost is ELTC. The laborer's surplus is the residual area LS. Economic surplus is 
area PS+LS, which is the sum of the producer surplus and the laborer's surplus (Nakajima, 1986). 
The household depicted in Figure 1 enjoys OL units ofleisure and employs Tq' units oflabor on the 
farm. Since the time endowment is OT, the household hires-in labor of q'L units for farm use. 
Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1, with the exception that the household hires-out labor. Farm 
profits are maximized at point Q in panel (a) and point q in panel (b) where the producer's surplus is 
recorded at distance DQ or area PS. Utility is maximized at point L' in panel (a) and point E in panel 
values from equation Ia are then used in Ib and Ic, to solve for L" and 1". Note that short-run 
farm profits (the square bracketed term in condition 1b) are fixed by the time the stage two 
solution is determined. 
3 At any given point along the curve CC', the marginal valuation offamily labor (MVFL) is 
derived by CC'=UdUI . The MVFL curve is not identical to the labor supply curve (Nakajima, 
1986). The supply curve ofany commodity is independent of the price of the commodity in 
question in that it should not shift due to a wage rate change. Instead, a wage rate change should -

lead to a movement along a given labor supply curve. Contrary to this, the MVFL curve would 
shift in response to a wage rate change. That is, there are numerous MVFL curves, each 
corresponding to a particular wage rate (Nakajima, 1986). 
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(b) where the laborer's surplus is area LS.4 Economic surplus is thus measured by the sum ofPS and 
LS. The household enjoys OLunits of leisure and utilizes Tq' units oflabor on the farm. Since OT 
is the total time endowment, the household commits Tq' units ofowned labor on the farm and hires-
out Lq' units to off-farm work for wages. Indeed, the producer's surplus measure will understate 
actual economic surplus in the case where a farm household is a combination of a laborer's household 
and a farm-firm. This will be the case irrespective ofwhether or not household members participate 
in off-farm markets, as evident from Figures 1 and 2. 
Economic Effects of a Price Support 
We illustrate the importance ofusing a farm household framework in farm policy analysis with 
an example of a price support. In Figure 3, the pre-policy farm profits are maximized at point p in 
panel (a), where Tfunits ofhousehold labor are devoted to farming. This is also evident in panel (b) 
where the value of marginal product of labor hk intersects the wage rate line WW' at point q. 
Household utility is maximized at point x, where 01 units ofleisure are consumed. In panel (b), utility 
is maximized at point e where the marginal valuation (cost) of family labor sr intersects the wage rate 
line WW'. The household devotes Ifunits of time to off-farm work in both panels. The pre-policy 
producer's surplus is hqW and the laborer's surplus is W'es. Hence, the pre-policy economic surplus 
is hqes. 
The introduction of a price support leads to a shift in the total value product curve from vt 
to vt' in panel (a). This corresponds to a shift in the marginal value product curve from hk to hk' in 
panel (b). Now the household maximizes farm profits at point p' in panel (a) and q' in panel (b) where 
-
4 Laborer's surplus is based on the sum ofowned labor devoted to work (both off-farm and •. 
on-farm). Therefore, even where there is no off-farm work, the laborer's surplus still has to be 
measured as in Figure 1. 
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Tf units of household labor are devoted to farming. As a result, household labor devoted to farming 
increases by fP units. Farm profits are now higher and the household's money income increases, 
leading to a shift in the budget constraint from ag to algI in panel (a). Utility is now maximized at 
point x' where it has increased from uu' to vv'. As a result, leisure consumption is increased from 01 
to 01' units in both panels. Time devoted to off-farm work declines from M=lfto M'=l'f units. s 
The producer's surplus increases by hqq' (from hqW to hq'W), and the laborer's surplus 
declines by see' (from Wes to We's).6 Total economic surplus change ofhq'q-see' in panel (b). What 
this implies is that an increase in the price of the agricultural commodity causes the household to 
increase its producer's surplus and to reduce its laborer's surplus from working (both on and off the 
farm). Therefore, when the equilibrium is perturbed by a price support, the marginal benefit from 
farming tends to exceed the marginal benefit from working. This causes the household to make a 
trade-offbetween the two surpluses, until the marginal benefit from farming is just equated to the 
marginal benefit from working (both on and off the farm). It then follows that the gain in the 
producer's surplus must be greater than the loss in the laborer's surplus (hqq'>see'). If this was not 
the case, there would indeed be no incentive for the household to make a trade-offbetween the two 
surpluses. 
S See Seleka for complete formal comparative statics results. 
6The graph depicts a rotation in the marginal valuation offamily labor curve. This was done 
for graphical convenience. In reality, the sr curve would shift, meaning that the new intersection ­
with the vertical axis would occur at a higher point than point s in Figure 3. Note .. 
however that the vertical distance between sr and srI narrows as the amount ofwork time is 
reduced. 
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Data and Empirical Application 
This section presents the data and empirical methodology used in the analysis of the welfare effects 
oftarget prices and acreage controls on U.S. com farm-households. The fundamental features of the 
u.s. com price support program analyzed in this paper are fixed target prices, deficiency payments, 
and acreage limits and set-aside (Gardner, 1992). Acreage set-asides are calculated as a percentage 
ofa farmer 'base acreage' (determined by a five-year moving average ofactual area planted plus set-
aside). Deficiency payments are calculated on historical acreage and fixed program yields' (Gisser, 
1993). However, a key aspect offarm policy is the voluntary nature of the program whereby some 
farmers opt out, given the cost of acreage limits and set-aside. 
Most ofthe summary statistics used in this study were obtained from the Economic Research 
Service (ERS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The data set from which 
group level summary statistics were derived was gathered by ERS through the 1991 Farm Cost and 
Returns Survey (FCRS). The summary data obtained were: a) group level average com production 
cost data per planted acre; b) group level mean values for other pertinent variables; and c) group level 
income statements for all farm enterprises. Com farm-households were decomposed into three 
categories based upon sales size: small, medium and large. 7 The three sales class categories were 
each further subdivided into two groups based upon whether or not individual households participate 
in otT-farm work. This yielded a total of six groups of farm households. This classification was 
meant to allow for the determination ofhow prevailing com policies affect the respective farm groups 
as separate economic agents. 
The ERS data is contained in Appendix A. Table A.l provides the per acre production cost 
-

7 Small producers are those with annual sales ofless than $40,000 per farm-household. 
Medium producers' annual sales fall within the range $40,000-$249,999 per farm-household. 
Large producer are those with annual sales of $250,000 and over per farm-household. 
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data for each group's representative household. The variables listed in Table Al are selfexplanatory, 
and are as obtained from ER~. Group level mean values of other pertinent data are presented in 
Table A2. The variables are listed as obtained with the exception that hours ofoperator and hours 
of other household members were converted from average weekly hours to total hours per year. 
Table A3 contains income statement data for the entire farm (for all farm operations). Additional 
statistics were obtained from other sources, which we will document along with the discussion of the 
model calibration procedure, to which we now tum. 
A non-linear algorithm ofGAMS was utilized to solve the U.S. com model. Initially, the 
model was calibrated with acreage controls and the target price in place. The production side of the 
model, with policy in place, was considered first using Table Al data. Three production factors were 
distinguished: unpaid (owned labor); land; and all other inputs. The production function for each 
group level representative household belonging to sales class I and participation class j was a Cobb-
y.. (,). 6 
Douglas type, Q ij = Aili/X jj '1<ij g, where A is the efficiency parameter, r represents labor (only 
owned labor for off-farm participants and all labor for non-participants), X denotes all other inputs 
(including hired labor for households not participating in off-farm work), K is the quantity ofland, 
and y, w, and f> are the respective production elasticities. Unpaid labor was distinguished because 
our interest lies in the time allocation mechanism. It is however worth emphasizing that for 
households not participating in off-farm work, hired and owned labor were assumed homogenous 
whereas they were assumed heterogenous for off-farm participants. Therefore, the production 
coefficient y is with respect to all labor in the case of households not participating in off-farm work 
-
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and with respect to only owned labor in the case of households participating in off-farm work.s 
Land was isolated to be able to detennine the effects ofacreage reduction. Other inputs were 
aggregated into a single input category. These include non-labor variable inputs, operating capital, 
non-land capital, and capital replacement (Table AI).9 Total fixed cash costs (Table AI) were not 
included among production inputs. Instead, these expenses were included in the calculation of 
exogenous income, as we will discuss later. Cobb Douglas production elasticities were approximated 
as factor shares, imposing constant return to scale (CRS).lO CRS was imposed by dividing 
expenditure on each factor by total production cost, instead ofdividing by the value ofoutput. From 
Table A2, we used hours worked by the operator and by other household members and the 
respective percentages of hours used in com production, to calculate owned com hours. The wage 
rate for each group was then calculated by dividing total value of unpaid labor by annual hours 
allocated to com production. 
The production side ofthe model was solved by assuming that, initially, com output, the com 
S The treatment of labor this way was a judgement call. Since those households participating 
in off-farm work employ hired labor as well, the time allocation mechanism could not be solved if 
we were to assume homogeneity since the model under such an assumption would not allow for 
off-farm work and hired labor employment to occur simultaneously. For households not engaged 
in off-farm work, the assumption of homogeneity seemed plausible since households hire-in labor 
and do not participate in off-farm work. 
9 As implied earlier, the all inputs category includes hired labor for off-farm participants. 
10 A proofof the relationship between factor shares and production elasticities is contained in 
Tyner and Tweeten (1965). Consider the case ofa Cobb-Douglas production technology. The 
factor share for input X may be defined as (PxX}/(PQ). A profit maximizing firm would equate 
the value ofmarginal product ofX to the price ofX. Therefore, in this case we can write 
aQ/ax = PJP. Multiplying both sides of this equation by XlQ yields the elasticity of production 
-

Ex = (aQ/aX) *(XlQ) = (PxX)/(PQ) =W. This shows that the factor share is equal to the 
production function coefficient under a premise that competitive equilibrium reigns and profit 
maximization is attained. Along similar lines, Y = (Wr)/(PQ). 
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producer price (the target price), the wage rate, the price of other inputs (Px), acreage, and 
production elasticities are exogenously given. The price of other inputs was set at unity. Output of 
a representative fann was computed by multiplying yield (Table A.l) by com acres (Table A.2). The 
target price of2.75 was used as the prevailing producer price of com for 1991 (USDA. 1992). 
The pre-policy production side model for a group level representative household contained 
three equations 
Yij (,)j' 6jjQ.. = A.T.. x.. 1<... (2a)IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ 
y··-I (,) 6··W .. = Py..A.,r.Y X .. IJK.. 'J (2b)IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ 
_ rYij (,)ij-I 6ijPx - Pw.. A..IJ .. x..IJ K· (2c)IJ IJ IJ 
where 2a is the production function and 2b and 2c are the two first order conditions for profit 
maximization, one with respect to labor (owned labor for off-farm participants and all labor for non­
participants) and the other with respect to all other inputs. The model was solved for optimal factor 
demands (r and X) and the production efficiency parameter (A), using a non-linear programming 
algorithm of GAMS. Since optimal farm hours of off-farm non-participants reflect both hired and 
owned labor, per our assumption ofhomogeneity, the shares of owned and hired labor in total labor 
cost were used to decompose quantities of labor into hired and owned. Short-run profits from com 
were derived as total com sales minus the sum of expenditures on all labor and all other inputs 
(variable production inputs). 
-
Production results were then used to solve for the consumption and the off-farm labor supply 
components. First, hours ofoff-fann work were calculated as annual income from off-farm wage and 
11
 
salary income (Table A2) divided by the wage rate detennined above. Total hours of endowment 
were calculated by assuming an average number of workers of 1.6 persons per representative 
household in each group. This was multiplied by 24 hours per day and 365 days per year to obtain 
total time endowment T. Other farm hours (non-com) were approximated by deducting time 
allocated to com from total farm time (Table A2). Hours of leisure were derived as total time 
endowment minus the sum of off-farm hours, owned com hours, and other farm hours (non-com). 
Since households engage in other farm production activities (non-com), as evident from the 
income statements (Table A3), earnings from such activities should be considered to better 
approximate the household's cash incomes, and total economic surplus. Precisely, restricted farm 
profits from non-com activities should be included in calculating money income. Therefore, 
Yij (,)jj-l 6ijPx = Pu>.. A..r.· x.. K· (3)IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ 
where R nc denotes short-run profits from non-com fanning activities, G denotes gross cash income 
(Table A3), E represents variable cash expenses (Table A3), TIc- = PQ -wr- -PxX - is optimal short-
run profit from com (from the production side) and 0 denotes household time spent on non-com 
farming activities. Exogenous (property) income (non-wage off-farm income) was computed from 
Tables A2 and A3 as the sum of net cash income from off-farm business, net cash income from 
another farm and ranch operation, interest and dividends, and other off-farm income (Table A2) 
minus the sum of real estate and property taxes, interest and insurance premium (Table A 3).11 
-
11 As we have noted, fixed cash expenses in Table Al were not included among our various 
input categories. Hence, we include them here in computing exogenous income. Data in Table 
A3 includes com data of Table Al and as such fixed com costs ofTable Al are a part of those 
ofTable A3. 
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Money income (I) for each representative household was then calculated as 
I.. = 1t~.* +"D.~ +W..U .. +V.. (4)IJ IJ "'iJ IJ IJ IJ 
where U=T-L denotes total work time by household members (the sum of time spent on all farming 
activities (com and non-com) and off-farm work time). Next, full income (Y) was calculated as the 
sum of money income and the value leisure time (Y=I+WT). The Cobb-Douglas utility parameter 
with respect to money income was derived as the share of money income in full income ( cc = I/Y). 
Similarly, the utility parameter with respect to leisure was computed as the share of the value of 
leisure in full income (P = WL *N).12 
Next, the market prices ofcom for the respective groups were determined by diving the gross 
value ofproduction by yield. From these, the market price of com for the entire U.S. was computed 
12 The utility function for a group level representative household was specified as a Cobb­
Douglas type U ij =lij aI)L ij
p.
I) , where cc and P are the respective parameters. Equations 1band 1c 
may be rewritten as 
I..+W..L.. =y .. = 1t~.* +W..T.. +V.. 
IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ 
Pjj I jj =W..
 
cc .. L.. IJ
 
IJ IJ 
Assuming that ccij +Pij= 1, one can use the fact that Pij = l-ccij in the second equation and 
rearrange terms to obtain 
cc..(W..L.. +1..) =I.. IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ 
Using the first equation, one can substitute Yij for the bracketed expression of the above equation 
and rearrange terms to obtain ccjj=lijNjj . This implies that the elasticity of the utility function 
with respect to money income may be approximated as the share of money income in full income. 
­Along similar lines, fl .. =(W..L ..)N.. , which is the share offull income spent on leisure generating P 1J IJ IJ IJ 
activities. 
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as a weighted average of prices faced by the respective groups. Constant elasticity domestic and 
export demand equations were used as approximations ofdemand equations. 13 The com domestic 
and export demand elasticities used were -0.2 and -1.0 (Bullock, 1992). The ratio ofcom export was 
computed using the 1991 export volume of 1,584 million bushels and production of 7,475 million 
bushels (USDA, 1993). This ratio was then used to decompose com output (model derived) into 
domestic demand and export demand. Using the estimate of the consumer price of com for the U. S. 
and the estimates ofdomestic and export demand elasticities and the respective quantities demanded, 
the constant elasticity demand shifting parameters were derived. 
With the base results determined, we then computed the no policy equilibrium data. Acres 
set aside were restored to the sector. This would ideally shift the output supply curve of each 
representative farm household to its no policy level. The no policy equilibrium output Q and output 
price P were solved endogenously by equating aggregate supply to aggregate demand. The following 
set ofequations were then simultaneously solved for the no policy output and output price 
Q .. = .. p € U .. <I>IJ IJ 
l/(l-y-w)y.. w· U 1)Y.. I W I) 6·· <1> .. = _IJ _ AK.. I) 
IJ ~[ W J1P J IJIJ ]ij X (5) 
-
where Eij =(Yij +wil<1-Yij -wij) is the price elasticity ofsupply, the first equation is the output supply 
13 The domestic and export demand equations were therefore defined by Qn = 8nP 1")D and 
QE =8EP 1")E , respectively. P denotes price, " represents the price elasticity of demand and 8 is 
the demand shifting parameter. 
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function for a group level representative farm (Seleka, 1996), the third expression represents group 
level output supply curve, and the last equation equates market supply with market demand. Total 
no policy output was then decomposed into domestic and export demand using the demand parameter 
estimates from above. Then, no policy variable factor usage, short-run profits and output supply 
quantities were computed. We then computed group level and total economic surplus measures for 
the no policy scenario (see Appendix B). These were then compared with their base counterparts to 
examine the effects of policy on the respective households and the distributional effects across the 
individual groups. 
Empirical Results 
Table 3 presents estimates of Cobb-Douglas production technology and utility parameters. 
As indicated, the production technology efficiency parameter estimates (A's) ranged from a low of 
2.225 to a high of3.199. Production elasticity coefficients with respect to labor (y 's) ranged from 
0.053 to 0.210. The production elasticity coefficient with respect to other inputs (w's) ranged from 
0.570 to 0.712, and varied positively with sales class. Production elasticity parameters with respect 
to land (l) 's) are within the range 0.216-0.262 and they seemed somewhat invariant across sales 
classes, with the exclusion ofthose for the large-participating and the medium-participating category. 
The other four groups produced land elasticities of about 0.22 whereas the medium-participating 
(large-participating) registered an elasticity coefficient of 0.26 (0.24). Therefore, the data would 
suggest that these latter groups contain farms with a relatively higher return on land, compared with 
the other four groups whose land coefficients are smaller and somewhat invariant. Table 3 also 
-

presents output supply elasticity estimates ( € 's). As indicated the estimates range from 2.812 though 
3.623. 
15 
In general, production elasticity coefficients appear to reinforce the previous findings in the 
literature. Floyd (1965) used an estimate of the share of land of 0.2 and that for labor and capital of 
0.8. Rosine and Heimberger (1974) estimated the production elasticities for land within the range 
0.1079 (1948) and 0.2158 (1970). The production elasticity with respect to labor (hired and owned) 
was within the range 0.3918 (1948) and 0.1973 (1970). The land parameter exhibited an upward 
trend between 1948 and 1970 whereas that for labor declined during this same period. Based upon 
such a trend and the estimates for 1970, one would conclude that the present estimates are consistent 
with the results of Rosine and Heimberger (1974). The results of Shumway, Talpaz, and Beattie 
(1979) were consistent with the findings of Rosine and Heimberger (1974). Gisser (1993) set the 
CES production function coefficient for land at 0.237 and that for all other inputs at 0.763, in his 
calibration of the com model (see p.597). Gisser's estimates were adopted from Kawagoe et al. 
(1986), who estimated the shares oflabor, machinery, land and fertilizer to be 0.403,0.310,0.237, 
and 0.051, for the time period 1930-80. 
Utility function parameters are also presented in Table 3. Parameters for money income (a's) 
fall within the range 0.185-0.836. These parameters increase with sales class, ifwe separate off-farm 
participants from non-participants. Within any given sales class, participating households tend to 
have a higher income share, compared with their non-participating counterparts. A reverse scenario 
is true for the coefficients for leisure (p's). Within a given participation class, the parameter for 
leisure declines with the increase in farm size (sales class). And within any given sales class, the 
leisure coefficient for nonparticipants is higher than that for participants. These results are mainly due 
to the fact that small-sized farms have lower money income (hence, a smaller share of money income 
-in full income) and that non-participating households devote relatively more time to leisure, compared 
.' 
with their participating counterparts who also devote some of their time to off-farm wage work. We 
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are not aware of any published utility parameter estimates in the literature to compare with the 
present estimates. 
Most of the coefficients for money income are greater that those for leisure, with the 
exception of those for the small-nonparticipating group and the medium-participating group. The 
coefficients for money income and leisure are however almost equal at 0.5 for the medium­
participating group. What may cause concern is the data for the small-nonparticipating group, which 
registered the leisure coefficient of0.815 and the money income coefficient of 0.185. Is it that these 
households value leisure that much or is it because ofother factors such as the unavailability ofoff­
farm work opportunities, which could not be captured by the present model? With the paucity of 
data, as is the present situation, there is no telling as to the likely cause of such an occurrence. It is 
also noteworthy that, since a single estimate ofthe number of adults per household was used across 
the various classes, the coefficient for leisure will be overestimated for households whose time 
endowment is much smaller than the average and will be underestimated for households experiencing 
the reverse. This is because we observed work time (farm and off-farm) and then assigned the 
residual time to leisure. This procedure was nonetheless the most realistic, given the scarcity of data. 
Table 3 also presents estimates ofprices. The wage rate varied across groups of farms, and 
tended to increase with sales class. That is, the smallest sales class faces lower wage rates, compared 
with medium-sized and large-sized classes. The hourly wage rate falls within the range $3.58-$5.14. 
The wage rate estimates are lower than published regional and U.S. estimates. For example, USDA 
(1992) reports U.S average hourly farm wages for 1991 of$5.62, $5.44, $5.35 and $5.70 for farm 
employees working during January 6-12, April 7-13, July 7-13, and October 16-12, respectively. An 
attempt to utilize published estimates in the model calibration exercise yielded variable input data that 
­
drastically deviated from observed input usage. Hence, a realistic approach was to utilize the wage 
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rate estimates generated from the model. 14 
The price of all other inputs was set at unity. The market price of com was estimated by 
dividing total com sales by output. As shown in Table 3, the market price of com varied across 
categories offarms. Precisely, market prices of com fall within the range $2.27-$2.35 per bushel. 
The com market price for the entire U.S. was recorded at $2.31, which was computed as a weighted 
average of group level prices. Group level prices fell within the range of published state level 
marketing prices. USDA (1993) reported prices falling within the range $2.12-$2.90. The U.S. 
average marketing price amounted to $2.37, and was a few cents larger than the present estimate of 
$2.31 per bushel. This study has therefore utilized prices that were generated from the summary 
statistics afforded to us by the ERS (Table A.l), rather than those published in other (USDA) 
sources. 
Table 4 presents policy induced changes in endogenous variables and household economic 
surplus measures. Let us evaluate the effects of this program sequentially. The results indicate that 
the implementation ofthe program under review has caused an increase in variable farm input usage. 
The increase in labor F falls within the range 52-216 hours, and it is positively correlated with farm 
size. The increase in other inputs X falls within the range 530-9,937 units (dollars), and it is also 
positively related to farm size. Hired labor for non-participants increased by 23 (118) hours from 
zero hours for small-nonparticipating (medium-nonparticipating) households. These households 
witnessed a transition from hiring-out to hiring-in labor. Therefore, these households would have 
participated in off-farm wage work in the absence of government intervention. The large-
nonparticipating class saw an increase in hired labor ofabout 317 hours, following the implementation 
-

14 As we have noted, wage rate estimates were generated by dividing the value of unpaid labor 
by the observed quantity of operator and other household labor. Therefore, any alteration of the 
wage rates generated will certainly alter hours ofowned labor devoted to com. 
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ofthe policy under review. 
Fann output increased in response to a net increase in variable factor usage. The increase in 
farm output is also positively related to farm size, and falls within the range 235-2,868 bushels per 
fann. Next, short-run fann profits from com PS increased. As evident, the producer's surplus change 
varies positively with farm size. Small-sized farms record a producer surplus increase amounting to 
about S200 (S250) for non-participants (participants), whereas large-sized farms record an increase 
of about S2,445 (participating) and S3,281 (non-participating). Medium-sized farms come second 
with a producer surplus increase ofabout S831 (S887) per farm for participants (non-participants). 
The increase in short-run profits from com then led to an increase in full income. The changes in full 
income are identical to those for short-run profits as indicated in Table 4 (i.e Y=1t+WT+V => 
dY=d 1t ; dT=dV=dW=O). 
The increase in full income further led to an increase in leisure and money income. The 
increase in leisure falls within the range 30-105 hours, and appears to generally vary positively with 
class size. The increase in money income is also positively correlated with farm size. Now, since 
both leisure and owned com hours have increased, with other farming hours and the time endowment 
held unchanged, off-farm time declined drastically enough to just offset the combined increase in 
leisure hours and owned com hours (Table 4). Because of the increase in leisure (or the net decrease 
in total work time), the valuation of owned work labor increased and the laborer's surplus declined 
as a result. Small-sized farm households registered a laborer's surplus reduction of about S180 per 
farm, whereas medium-sized fanns experienced a decline ofabout S340. The large sized-participating 
category recorded a laborer's surplus decrease of S568 per farm, whereas the large-nonparticipating 
-
category registered a decrease of S283 per farm. 
The producer's surplus increase should more that offset a laborer's surplus decrease so that, 
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in net, this policy would lead to a positive economic surplus change. The results in Table 4 confirm 
this. The economic surplus change varied positively with farm size. The range was $21 through 
$2,713 per farm. The results of this section indicate that the conventional analysis producer surplus 
changes, at the exclusion of the laborer's surplus change, would generally lead to an overstatement 
ofeconomic surplus change. Therefore, we now have adequate empirical evidence to suggest that, 
following the convention of sole reliance on the producer surplus change, it would be quite likely to 
overstate the improvement in household welfare, resulting from any particular market oriented 
government program. 
The implication of the distributional effects of the com program are very clear. It is evident 
that the benefits to small-sized farms are relatively negligible. This class records an economic surplus 
increase of only $21 ($65) per farm for non-participating (participating) households. The medium­
sized class saw an economic surplus increase of about $494 ($532) per farm for participating (non­
participating) households. Large-sized farms on the other hand saw the highest economic surplus 
increase of $2, 163 ($2,713) per farm for non-participants (participants). These results would not 
justify government support, ifthe overall objective ofgovernment intervention is to improve the well­
being ofpoor farm families. Therefore, the gains from government activity in the com market appear 
to be misdirected. Hence, the objective of improving low farm incomes is clearly unrealized. 
Concluding Remarks 
The central objectives of this paper were to show that the producer's surplus is not an accurate 
measure of farm-household welfare and that welfare consequences of farm policies vary across 
producers. Empirical estimates of the laborer's surplus indicate that the economics of farm ­
households calls for the inclusion of the laborer's surplus in measuring welfare. Two observations 
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can be made concerning the measurement ofeconomic surplus. Ignoring the laborer's surplus would 
(a) understate the magnitude of welfare currently enjoyed by farm households, and (b) overstate the 
improvement in welfare resulting from the implementation of any market oriented policy. That is, 
utilizing only the producer's surplus change to measure economic surplus change (induced by market 
oriented programs), at the exclusion of the laborer's surplus change, would normally overstate 
household welfare improvement. The reason is that, market oriented policies intended to increase 
the producer surplus, would also lead to a reduction in the laborer's surplus, as households reallocate 
their labor among competing alternatives. These results reinforce the argument that the household 
can be viewed to allocate its resources in a way that maximizes the sum of the laborer's surplus and 
the producer's surplus. Therefore, any time a market oriented (producer biased) policy is introduced, 
the household would make a tradeoffbetween the two surpluses, in a way that would lead to a net 
gain in household welfare. In particular, any policy geared towards increasing the producer's surplus 
would lead to a reduction in the laborer's surplus, but the net effect would be a net increase in 
economic surplus. 
We also examined the distributional consequences of the com program among the various 
groups of farms. The empirical results showed that the U.S. com program aids large-sized farms 
relatively more than small-sized and medium-sized ones. Moreover, medium-sized farms have seen 
greater economic surplus improvement, compared with small-sized farms. In point of fact, policy 
induced improvement in the well-being of small-sized farms is so negligible that economic surplus 
increases may be safely rounded to zero. A welfare improvement of$21 ($64) per farm was recorded 
for small-nonparticipating (participating) households. It would indeed be not persuasive to argue that 
small-sized farms would have been worse offin the absence of the program. ­
These results question whether program objectives are being realized in aiding the poor 
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fanner. Indeed, program benefits appear to be misdirected to households who do not seem to require 
government support, at the expense of small and more needy farm households. Therefore, the 
implications ofthese results are a clear indication that government involvement or activity in the U.S. 
com market needs to be revised/revisited. If the objective is to sustain the poorest farm families in 
farming, non-market oriented policies such as lump-sum transfers may be more effective since they 
can target support to the most needy farm-households.. 
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Appendix B 
Economic Surplus Measurement 
In stage I of optimization, the farm household determines optimal producer's surplus (n): 
C' •n·· =p Q.. -WIJIJ..r'"-PxX.. · (B.I)IJ qlJ IJ 
Note here that producer surplus is identical to restricted (shot-run) profits. IS 
In stage 2, the optimal amount of the laborer's surplus is determined subject to optimal producer's 
surplus. Therefore, following the first stage, the income constraint (equation I b) may be rewritten 
as 
I .. =FI..+W..U ..IJ IJ IJ IJ (B.2) 
where FI .. =n~· +R~+V .. denotes fixed income and the second term where U.. =T .. -L.. denotes theIJ IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ 
variable component of money income. Note that Uij=Tij-Lij represents total work time (off-farm 
and farming time). 
For a Cobb-Douglas utility function, the marginal valuation (cost) of family labor may be 
expressed as 
UL(I L) A.. I.. A.. I.. Q .. = '= .!J!.--.!L = P 1J IJ (B.3)IJ U1(I,L) Ct .. L.. Ct.. (T..-U..)IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ 
Evidently, the marginal valuation offamily labor (equation B.3) is a function of work time (or leisure 
time) and income. But since money income is also a function ofwork time (or leisure), we can utilize 
equation B.2 to rewrite equation B.3 as 
A .. [FI.. +W..(T.. -L..)] A .. [FI..+W..u .. ]Q.. =.!J!. IJ IJ IJ IJ =.!J!. IJ IJ IJ (B.4)IJ Ct.. L.. Ct.. T..-u..IJ IJ IJ IJ IJ 
Equation B.4 indicates that the marginal valuation (cost) of family labor curve is upward 
sloping with respect to owned work time and downward sloping with respect to leisure, as was drawn 
IS Note that producer surplus is defined as the triangle-like area above the output supply curve 
and below the product price line. This area is equivalent to restricted profits in the case where we 
-

have concave production functions with respect to variable production factors. This should be 
obvious because an(pq)/apq=Q(Pq)' From this result, it follows that fQ(Pq)dPq=n(pq)' 
Therefore, integrating the output supply curve should precisely define short-run farm profits. 
- - -
in Figures 1 and 2.16 The laborer's surplus can therefore be calculated as 
u.. T·· 
_ fl .. vFI..+WU.. _ fl .. vFI..+W..(T.. -L..) 
= W..U.. -.!2!f IJ 1JdU.. = W ..U .. -.!2!f IJ IJ IJ IJ 
IJ IJ a.. T..-U.. IJ IJ IJ a.. L..
IJO IJ IJ 1Ji:.. IJ 
I) (B.5) 
= W..U.. + Pij[Iw..T .. +FI..VI~ .. -lnT..)+w.h.. -iJlIJ IJ a.. \.. IJ IJ IJ}; IJ IJ IA IJ IJ/J
IJ 
where U=T-L denotes the optimal amount of time devoted to work (farm and off-farm) and L is 
the optimal amount of leisure time. 17 Total economic surplus for a representative household (ESij)' 
16 This can be shown by partial differentiating equation B.4 with respect to leisure or total 
work time to obtain 
an = _1![FI +WT]= _ an <0 
aL a L2 au 
where the ij's have been dropped. 
17 It is noteworthy here that
 
-
U T 
J!fFI+WU dU =J! fFI +W(T-L) dL = -J![(WT+FI)(lnL-InT)+W(T-L)] 
a T-U ai: L ao 
where the ij's have been dropped. Note that this expression denotes total valuation (cost) of 
family labor devoted to work (all work). Therefore, the laborer's surplus is precisely calculated as 
total wage income (farm and off-farm) minus total cost of owned labor. Recall that farm work is 
assumed to be remunerated at the same wage rate as does off-farm work when calculating the 
producer's surplus. The value unpaid (family) labor was, among other variable inputs, deducted 
-

from farm revenues to compute the producer surplus. Thus, the producer's surplus does not 
capture returns to family labor. The laborer's surplus calculation, therefore, is concerned with 
measuring net returns to family labor put to work (farm and off-farm).. 
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Table I Distribution of off-farm income by sales class, 1986. 
Off-farm income 
Percent of Percent total Percent of 
sector's Average Total cash income sectors's 
Agricultural farms $ ($000,000) from off-farm off-farm 
Subsector sources income 
All farms 100 20,212 44,708 46 100 
Sales class 
Less than $40,000 73 22,534 36,336 96 81 
$40,00-$99,999 13 13,780 4,053 37 9 
$100,000-$249,999 10 12,602 2,648 17 6 
$250,000 or more 4 17,562 1,670 5 4 
Source: Extracted from Ahearn and Lee (1991), Table 1.2 
I 
Table 2 Corn Production Costs Per Acre 
Variable 
Sales Class 
less than $40,000 (Small) $40,000-$249,999 (Medium) $250,000 and over (Large) 
Off-farm=Ycs Off-farm = No Off-farm=Yes Off-farm = No Off-farm = Yes Off-farm = No 
Total number of farms (expanded) 52,898.10 64,609.21 114,215.82 128,440.54 26,335.81 36,905.04 
Total number of farms (sample) 83.00 88.00 179.00 213.00 53.00 92.00 
Average yield per acre 85.69 80.05 112.27 105.85 119.80 114.51 
Gross value of production 194.43 186.48 256.51 242.96 281.04 266.92 
IIired labor 1.10 2.54 3.92 3.17 12.63 14.28 
Other Variable inputs 113.73 106.16 122.67 127.60 138.34 156.94 
Total variable cash costs 114.83 108.70 126.59 130.77 150.97 157.97 
General Farm overhead 11.25 16.60 10.77 10.35 8.46 10.61 
Taxes and insurance 16.29 17.15 19.01 18.82 15.87 18.04 
Total Interest 15.91 4.85 17.53 13.03 21.42 18.76 
Total fixed cash costs 43.46 38.59 47.31 42.20 45.75 47.42 
Total cash costs 158.29 147.29 173.91 172.97 196.73 205.39 
Gross value of production less cash costs 36.14 39.19 82.60 69.99 84.31 61.53 
Capital replacement 21.99 22.04 23.26 25.95 29.13 33.83 
Operating capital 3.12 2.96 3.44 3.56 4.11 4.30 
Nonland capital 10.17 10.11 9.33 10.19 10.12 11.23 
Net land rent 52.78 54.51 67.13 57.26 64.17 61.22 
lJ npaid la bor 41.09 49.35 26.18 29.34 14.35 13.58 
Total economic costs 271.53 281.41 285.73 286.23 297.19 310.79 
Gross value production less economic costs -77.10 -94.93 -29.22 -43.27 -16.15 -43.86 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service 
~ I 
Table 3 Parameter Estimates and Prices 
Variable 
Sales class 
less than $40,000 (Small) $40,000-$249,999 (Medium) $250,000 and over (Large) 
Off-rarm= Yes Off-rann=No Off-rann= Yes Off-rann = No Off-rarm= Yes Off-rann= No 
Production Parameters 
A 
'Y 
w 
() 
t 
2.692 
0.168 
0.615 
0.216 
3.623 
2.977 
0.210 
0.570 
0.220 
3.544 
3.199 
0.102 
0.635 
0.262 
2.812 
2.678 
0.126 
0.651 
0.223 
3.490 
2.225 
0.053 
0.712 
0.235 
3.252 
2.425 
0.099 
0.684 
0.217 
3.608 
Prices (dollars) 
Wage rate 3.725 3.584 4.267 4.560 5.129 5.138 
Price or other inputs 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Producer Price (weighled AVG = 2.309) 2.269 2.330 2.276 2.295 2.346 2.331 
Utility Function Parameters 
Ct 
{3 
0.550 
0.450 
0.185 
0.815 
0.607 
0.393 
0.473 
0.527 
0.836 
0.164 
0.789 
0.211 
I 
Table 4 Effects of the Corn Program (Changes in Exogenous Variables) 
Sales class
 
Variable
 
$250,000 and over (Large) $40,000-$249,999 (Medium) less Ihan $40,000 (Small) 
OIT-farm=NoOff-farm = Yes OIT-farm = No Off-farm = Yes Off-farm = No OIT-farm=Yes 
216110 1437654 
2,593 
52Inpuls: F 
7,7139,937529 2,014711X 
1,5981,968 1,4301,679 11,3721,255Owned hours 
31711923Hired Labor (non-pari) 
2,5282,868883530 
113,376,800 
235266OUlpUI (bu): Per farm 
93,285,19075,542,21060,553,07015,189,25014,083,420Group Level 
000000Time endowmenl 
1,5981,968 1,4301,372 
0 
1,6791,255Corn hours 
000 
-2,070 
00Olher farm hours 
-1,699-1,535
-1,448 
103 
-1,725-1,285OIT-farm hours 
100105774630Leisure hours 
Incomes per household 
00 000 
-2,070 
0Properly Income 
-1,699-1,535
-1,448 
0 
-1,725-1,285OfHarm wage income 
000 
504 
00Nel incomes for non-corn 
1,9302,74442038137Money income 
2,4453,281887831204250Full income 
Welfare Changes 
2,4453,281887831 
113,968,800 
204250PS: Househo/d level 
90,246,63086,407,80094,934,130 
-338 
13,189,16013,218,070Group level 
-283-568-355
-183 
-45,608,700 
-185LS: Household 
-10,428,500-14,966,700
-38,548,700 
0 
-11,839,800-9,796,450Group level 
000 
° 
0 
0R: Household ° 0000Group level 
2,1632,713532494 
68,390,080 
2165ES: Household 
7,981,813714,411,30056,385,4201,349,3133,421,622Group level 
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Appendix A 
Data Used in Model Calibration 
Table A.I Corn Production Costs Per Acre 
Sales Class 
Variable 
less Ihan $40,000 (Small) $40,000-$249,999 (Medium) $250,000 and over (Large) 
Off-farm=Yes Off-farm = No Off-fann= Yes Off-farm=No Off-farm = Yes Off-farm = No 
Tolal number of farms (expanded) 52,898.10 64,609.21 114,215.82 128,440.54 26,335.81 36,905.04 
TOlal number of farms (sample) 83.00 88.00 179.00 213.00 53.00 92.00 
Average yield per acre 85.69 80.05 112.27 105.85 119.80 114.51 
Gross value of production 194.43 186.48 256.51 242.96 281.04 266.92 
lIired labor 1.10 2.54 3.92 3.17 12.63 14.28 
Olher Variable inputs 113.73 106.16 122.67 127.60 138.34 156.94 
Tolal variable cash coslS 114.83 108.70 126.59 130.77 150.97 157.97 
General Fann overhead 11.25 16.60 10.77 10.35 8.46 10.61 
Taxes and insurance 16.29 17.15 19.01 18.82 15.87 18.04 
TOlal Inleresl 15.91 4.85 17.53 13.03 21.42 18.76 
TOlal fixed cash costs 43.46 38.59 47.31 42.20 45.75 47.42 
TOIal cash cosls 158.29 147.29 173.91 172.97 196.73 205.39 
I 
Table A.I (Continued) Corn Production Costs Per Acre 
Sales Class 
Variable 
less than $40,000 (Small) $40,000-$249,999 (Medium) $250,000 and over (Large) 
Off-farm = Yes Off-farm = No Off-farm = Yes Off-fann=No Off-fann=Yes Off-farm = No 
Gross value of production less cash costs 36.14 39.19 82.60 69.99 84.31 61.53 
Capital replacement 21.99 22.04 23.26 25.95 29.13 33.83 
Operating capital 3.12 2.96 3.44 3.56 4.11 4.30 
Nonland capital 10.17 10.11 9.33 10.19 10.12 11.23 
Net land rent 52.78 54.51 67.13 57.26 64.17 61.22 
Unpaid labor 41.09 49.35 26.18 29.34 14.35 13.58 
Total economic costs 271.53 281.41 285.73 286.23 297.19 310.79 
Gross value production less economic costs -77.10 -94.93 -29.22 -43.27 -16.15 -43.86 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service 
I 
Table A.2 Other Pertinent Data 
Variable 
Small 
Sales Class 
Medium Large 
On:farm= Yes Off-farm = No Off-limn = Yes on: farm = No Off-farm = Yes On:farm=No 
Hours of operator per year 
% hours for corn 
1,575 
28 
1,907 
23 
2,663 
30 
2,938 
28 
2,880 
33 
3,123 
25 
Hours of other household members per year 
% hours for corn 
714 
17 
647 
II 
893 
15 
1,237 
12 
1,889 
26 
1,747 
14 
Other sources of farm income 
Customs work for others 
Grazing of livestock 
Cooperative patronage dividends 
Sales of farm machinery and vehicles 
Insurance indemnity and payments 
Hunting, fishing and outdoor recreation 
708 
0 
72 
189 
84 
0 
51 
0 
140 
19 
151 
0 
1,312 
46 
452 
436 
698 
5 
1,049 
II 
691 
214 
684 
3 
4,918 
1,918 
1,132 
310 
1,574 
0 
4,653 
390 
868 
2,200 
1,024 
27 
Off-farm income 
Cash wages and salaries 
Net cash income from on:larm husiness 
Net cash income Ihml another farm or ranch 
Interest and dividends 
Other off-farm income 
22,500 
500 
0 
500 
500 
0 
1,750 
500 
1,750 
1,750 
12,500 
500 
0 
500 
500 
0 
500 
0 
500 
500 
17,500 
500 
0 
1,750 
1,750 
0 
500 
0 
1,750 
500 
Acres planted to corn 
Inigated acres 
Non-irrigated acres 
Set-aside acres 
I 
51 
4 
0 
37 
2 
12 
140 
12 
22 
129 
12 
102 
413 
41 
142 
246 
32 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service 
I 
Table A.3 Income Statement for Farm Business, 1991 FCRS, Corn Version 
Sales Class 
Variahle 
less Ihan $40,000 (Small) $40,000-$249,999 (Medium) $250,000 and over (Large) 
Off-tarm= Yes Off-farm = No Off-farm = Yes Off-farm = No Off-farm = Yes Oll~farm= No 
52,898 64,609Total number of farms (expanded) 114,216 128,441 26,336 36,905 
83
 88
 179
Total numher of farms (sample) 213
 53
 92
 
229
 471
214
 526
 1,855Tolal acres operated 1,764 
51
 38
 157
 156
 519
Corn acres planted 398
 
18
 28
 48
 45
Other crop acres planted 50
 148
 
60
55
 30
 38
Average cash rent per acre 73
 46
 
2,232 8,641Average cash rent and AUM expense 588
 5,642 27,764 26,990 
2,293 1,028 14,425Shared rent estimale incl. liveslock 16,142 30,414 28,797 
20,351 102,97120,842 110,097 443,771Gross Cash Income 592,418 
7,386 9,875 43,529 53,853 207,108 335,670· Livestock sales 
10,492 47,8988,300 45,026 199,968 214,753· Crop sales 
1,352 5,6811,077 5,581 20,049· Government paymenls 19,921 
5,8631,120 1,590 5,637 16,646· Other larm-relaled in<:ome 22,074 
I 
Table A.3 (Continued) Income Statement for Farm Business, 1991 FCRS, Corn Version 
Variable OIT-farm=¥es On~larm=No (>1'1'- farm = ¥ es Off-farm= No OIT-farm=¥es OIT-larm=No 
Less: Cash Expenses 22,808 19,529 81,360 82,518 352,387 454,926 
- Variable 15,838 15,552 58,709 62,259 269,540 377,041 
· l.ivestock purchases 1,134 910 5,853 5,522 59,370 124,265 
· Feed 1,716 1,959 10,991 11,456 37,767 72,705 
· Olher livestock expenses 179 114 333 537 1,170 1,849 
· Seed and plants 1,445 1,154 4,679 4,489 18,139 14,166 
· Fertilizer and chemicals 3,776 4,018 13,257 13,405 54,379 48,708 
· Labor 390 744 2,562 3,558 25,056 32,948 
· Fuel and oils 1,600 1,453 4,534 4,783 19,392 16,419 
· Repairs and maintenance 2,631 2,456 7,144 7,994 25,477 22,541 
· Machine-hire and custom work 561 563 1,827 2,455 7,734 12,143 
· Utilities 672 790 2,316 2,498 6,696 9,631 
· Other variable expenses 1,433 1,038 3,666 3,746 9,503 14,137 
-Fixed 6,967 3,977 22,651 20,258 82,847 77,885 
· Real estate, property taxes 1,125 1,576 2,047 2,763 9,198 8,186 
· Interest 2,614 916 8,806 8,394 35,035 26,898 
· Insurance premium 940 875 2,670 2,947 7,463 13,058 
· Rent and lease payments 2,288 610 9,128 6,155 31,151 29,743 
Equal: Net cash farm income -2,453 1,313 21,611 27,580 91,384 137,492 
Less: Depreciation 3,428 2,325 10,466 11,480 28,571 30,648 
Labor, non-cash benefits 2 58 68 270 1,405 2,064 
Plus: Value of inventory change 3,917 2,049 2,285 2,344 27,222 11,164 
Nonmoney income 2,495 3,084 2,667 2,632 4,898 5,053 
Equals: Net farm income 529 4,063 16,027 20,805 93,527 121,002 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service 
I 
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